📢 German Data Protection Authorities reject chat scanning and encryption weakening
Ahead of the ongoing EU negotiations on potential “chat control” mechanisms, the German Data Protection Conference (Datenschutzkonferenz/DSK/joint body of all independent data protection authorities in Germany) has issued a clear position:
1) No blanket scanning of private messages.
2) No detection orders.
3) No weakening or bypassing of end‑to‑end encryption.
The DSK warns that:
• Mass scanning of private chats, whether in the network or directly on devices (client‑side scanning), would effectively neutralise end‑to‑end encryption.
• Backdoors or scanning obligations would create systemic vulnerabilities that could be exploited not only by authorities, but also by criminal actors.
• Intrusive tools should only be used in specific, suspicion‑based cases, authorised by a judicial authority instead of across entire populations.
Latest developments in Brussels: On 11 March 2026, the European Parliament voted to extend the current voluntary detection regime (derogation from the ePrivacy Directive) until 3 August 2027.
The objective: avoid a regulatory gap while negotiations on the permanent CSAM Regulation continue. Parliament made several key clarifications:
• Voluntary measures must remain proportionate and strictly targeted.
• They should apply only to previously identified CSAM or content flagged by users, trusted flaggers, or organisations.
• They must not apply to end‑to‑end encrypted communications.
• Scanning of traffic data in addition to content data should not be allowed.
Negotiations between Parliament, Council and Commission began on 12 March 2026.
My view: Strong child protection and strong encryption are not contradictory goals. Both are essential. But mass surveillance tools, warrantless scanning, and structural weakening of encryption are fundamentally incompatible with European fundamental rights, cybersecurity, and the rule‑of‑law principles the EU is built on.
Take the joint investigation by NDR and SPIEGEL as an example. They showed that large volumes of child sexual abuse imagery can be removed quickly and effectively without undermining encryption.
Jurnalists found that most illegal material was not stored in the Darknet, but on ordinary Clearnet hosting servers. By directly notifying those providers, they reported around 80,000 links to illegal content and triggered the deletion of 13.55 terabytes of material within hours (around one year of HD video).